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This paper specifies competences and skills of methodologically rational decision making 
and their impact on security of organisations.  The study indicates some reasons for 
developing the competencies and skills in education, professional development and taking 
them into account in the recruitment. It is the practical aim of this paper. Its scientific 
aim is to formulate and to partly justify general hypotheses concerning the impact of 
methodologically rational and irrational attitudes of members of organisations on their 
security. We apply the method of ideal types of Max Weber and phenomenological analyses, 
which concern intentionality of methodologically rational and irrational mental attitudes.
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Introduction
The article makes a contribution to the ongoing discussion concerning the role 
of attitudes and virtues in organisation management (Dyck, Neubert, 2008; Rego, 
Cunha, Clegg, 2012; van Hooft, 2013). The paper presents relationships between 
methodologically rational or irrational attitudes of the organisation’s members 
and its security. The scientific purpose of the study is to formulate and partly 
justify some research hypotheses concerning the relationships.  The practical 
objective of the study is to indicate some reasons for developing competences and 
abilities of methodologically rational decision‑making process and taking them 
into account in recruitment of new organisation’s members.
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Notions such as “organisation’, “security”, “methodological rationality” are 
these days ambiguous, yet, discussing divergent ways of defining the notions 
is not the focal point of the paper. Their meaning will be determined by means 
of regulatory definitions.  Further the study applies the ideal types method, 
developed among others, by Max Weber (2011, 2012). It consists of a thinking 
experiment. Two idealized and opposite situations are compared with each 
other (referred to as “models”): Model A, in which decision makers make 
methodologically rational decisions in line with Model B, in which they tend to 
take methodologically irrational decisions. The analysis and comparison of the 
two models will allow to formulate some research hypotheses concerning the 
impact of methodologically rational and irrational attitude of members of an 
organisation on its security.
The method is accompanied by phenomenological analysis (Smith, 2013) of 
intentionality of rational and irrational attitudes. The analysis can partly justify 
the above hypotheses, however, it does not prove them. The hypotheses are of 
supposition‑like nature (partly justifiable) that streamline further empirical 
researches to examine them and theoretical researches, which may lead towards 
more detailed and specific hypotheses concerning particular contexts and aspects 
of organisational activities.
In the text “organisation” means an organised and structured system of 
elements, that (as a whole) performs specified functions in a self‑specific way and 
whose elements are, among others, people (called “members of organisation”). 
Considering the above, such an institution as, for example, a state, corporation, 
firm, chain organisation, family and alike are an organisation (Greenwald, 
2008).
Because of the difference between existential (structural) and functional 
aspect of an organisation (Arbib, Érdi, Szentagothai, 1998; Haimes, 2015; 
Koźmiński, Latusek‑Jurczak, 2011; Wrench, Punyanunt‑Carter, 2012), its 
existential (structural) and functional security are distinguished. Existential 
security of organisations consists in the likelihood of their existence. The larger 
the likelihood is, the more secure the organisation is. Any threat to the security 
reduces the chances for the organisation to further exist. This type of security is 
determined by prerequisites and preconditions to its existence. For instance, loss 
of liquidity poses a threat to the existential security of a firm operating in free 
market economy.
It is assumed that each organisation has its own specific objective or set 
of operational objectives, i.e. such ones that determine its ontological identity 
(nature, specificity) (Greenwald, 2008; Richmond, McCroskey, McCroskey, 2004). 
Functional security of an organisation translates into its ability to reach these 
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objectives.  If there is a  factor threatening its functional security, the very 
factor makes the functioning of the organisation less effective or less efficient 
(economical) while reaching the target set, than it could be if the factor did not 
occur. For instance, corruption is a threat to efficient organisational functioning. 
In majority of cases functional threats are also existential ones. Functional security 
of an organisation is determined by its specific operational objectives that could 
be varied. For example, they might include meeting the needs of the organisation’s 
members (e.g. owner, employees) and other people (e.g. stakeholders, customers). 
It their needs are well satisfied, the organisation is secure in the personal aspect. 
(Carroll, Arkin, Wichman, 2015).
Existential and functional security of an organisation has objective and 
subjective aspects (Webb, Wills‑Herrera, 2012). Within the objective aspect 
(objective security of an organisation), the organisation is secure in both 
existential and functional terms. The organisation is subjectively secure when its 
members are convinced that it is objectively secure (Loranty, 2012; Tang, 2010). 
This article focuses solely on the objective security of an organisation.
Verbs used in the article demoting the impact of attitudes upon security of an 
organisation, such as: “facilitates”, “reduces risk”, “limits opportunity”, “impedes” 
mean likelihood. The statement that “x facilitates y” means that y is more likely, 
when x occurs than when x does not exist at all. Yet, the statement “x reduces the 
risk of y”, “x limits opportunity y” or “x impedes y” means that y is less likely when 
x occurs than in case of x being not existent.
The hypotheses included in the article concern decision makers within an 
organisation, proportionally to their influence on its shape and operations. For 
instance, security of democratic states depends to a larger extent on their citizens 
than in case of states with no civic participation. In both cases there is a group 
of people (leaders, managers, citizens, etc.) having influence on the shape and 
operations of their organisation, and it’s the group that the hypotheses put 
forward in the article refer to.
In case of the models presented in the article it is assumed that members of 
an organisation do not aim at destroying it (e.g. sabotage). Yet, in reality such kind 
of possibility should not be excluded. Therefore, the assumption is that in the 
examined models decision makers value the security of their organisation and/
or set such objectives that contribute to its security (e.g. is someone works for 
a company only to earn a lot but doing so fulfills the responsibilities well and in 
this way she/he contributes to the security of the organisation).
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Methodological rationality of decisions and attitudes
Methodological rationality is a feature of attitudes and decisions1. According 
to Tadeusz Kotarbiński, while taking a  rationally methodological decision, (i.e. 
in a methodologically rational way), its subject “…acts in line with the knowledge 
gained, and the knowledge gained should be understood as the overall information 
acquired by an individual which – considering the way the information is justified 
– could be likely and realistic enough to treat it and act as if the information was 
true” (Kotarbiński, 1973, p. 123). 
It is assumed (regulatory definition) that there are 3 necessary conditions 
(whose conjunction is a  sufficient condition) for methodologically rational 
decisions: Their subject
(x) examines justification of his/her beliefs, 
(y) tries to consider all possible solutions,
(z) from amongst all possible solutions chooses the best justified one against the 
background of the knowledge gained.
Therefore, “methodologically rational” decisions are those that meet the three 
conditions above. The definition by Kotarbiński concerns directly the last (z) of 
them, yet, it implies the assumed remaining conditions (x) and (y). They have been 
enlisted as there are likely cases when an enity while taking a decision satisfying 
condition (z) does not investigate the justification of his beliefs (condition x is not 
fulfilled) or unjustifiably rules out some opportunities to take action (condition y 
is not fulfilled). The former option presented is elaborated on by, i.a. Józef Maria 
Bocheński (1987) and is associated with kind of superstition (prejudice), whereas 
the latter one (in the context of the choice of scientific hypotheses) is discussed 
by, i.a. Karl Rajmund Popper (1999, pp. 211–212).
Terms such as “better justified” or “the best justified” are conceptualised in 
this article in the way they are used in the writings by the representatives of the 
Lviv‑Warsaw School represented by Kotarbiński: “Better justified” means “more 
likely” and the “best justified” – “the most likely” (Kotarbiński, 1986, pp. 226–227). 
It is assumed that not only beliefs and statements (condition x) but also decisions 
1 Attitude is called here the human inclination to a particular method of fulfilling 
acts.  Attitude is a  system of emotional cognitive and behavioural factors: One of the 
attitude’s elements is the emotional component, that is your emotional reactions to the 
subject of attitude (e.g. another person or social problem), cognitive component, that is 
your thoughts and beliefs about the object of the attitude and behavioural component – 
your actions, that is observable behaviour towards the subject of attitude (Aronson et al., 
1997, p. 314).
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(condition z) might be worse or better justified. The justification of a decision consists 
in proving the likelihood that the action that decision triggers is going to be both 
effective and efficient. The larger the likelihood is, the better justified the decision is. 
Rational beliefs satisfy the condition (x). (Bortolotti, 2010, p.  11). They 
result from rational assertion within which its subject is sure of his/her beliefs 
proportionally to their justification – the subject is more certain of those that 
are better justified, than of the ones that are justified worse. Irrational assertion 
comes down to the fact that subject is sure of the beliefs independently of their 
justification, therefore the subject could be more certain of (depending on the 
knowledge gained) worse justified beliefs than those that are justified in a better 
way (Bortolotti, 2010; Jacko, 2016). In the contemporary literature the inclination 
to methodologically rational assertion is referred to as “rational assertiveness”. 
Irrational assertiveness is then, referred to as the tendency to irrational assertion 
(Alberti, Emmons, 2001; Jacko, 2016; Paris, Casey, 1979; Robinson, 1982).
Excessively detailed examination of justification of beliefs (condition x) might 
impede the way of acting, for instance the case of someone defaulting on decision 
making process at the right time, which might result from spending too much 
time and using too much energy on examining forecast. The above is an example 
of lack of assertiveness which is a drawback to any kind of decisions, including 
methodologically rational ones. The methodologically rational attitude should be 
associated with rational assertiveness, the idea of which is, i.e.: that its subject 
acts in a way that is the most effective and efficient in the subject’s opinion, thus 
it aims to minimise a risk. However, the risk may be taken if defaulting on acting 
is riskier to the best of the subject’s knowledge than taking the very risk (Alberti, 
Emmons, 2001; Paris, Casey, 1979; Robinson, 1982).
Therefore, the methodologically rational attitude (see footnote 1) will be used to 
denote the inclination, rooted in the acting person, to making a methodologically 
rational decision (satisfying the conditions x, y, z). Thanks to such attitude the 
person is willing to take decisions of this kind despite endogenous (e.g. being 
fearful, afraid, or attacked) or exogenous (e.g. adverse circumstances, social 
stereotypes, environment pressure) determinants.  The ancient men of wisdom 
referred to this attitude in their concept of right reason (gr. ὀρθός λόγος) and 
virtue (gr. ἀρετή). As indicated by i.a. Plato and Aristotle, the two qualities 
stem from both seeking and respecting the truth as well as the inclination to 
taking decisions in line with what the truth requires (Jaeger, 1964; Veath, 2003). 
Such a  concept was also discussed by the philosophers of the Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment as well as the contemporary ones (Gomez, 
2014). Despite the fact that the above presented discussion on methodologically 
rational decisions and attitudes embedded in philosophy, their above definition is 
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of a regulatory nature – the methodological rationality of decisions and attitudes 
may be described either in the way similar to the one presented in the article 
or in a  much different way (Abell, 1991; Auspitz et al., 1992; Ciesielski, 2012; 
Coleman, Fararo, 1992; Dennis, 2012; Gerrard, 1993; Hey, 1993; Kleszcz, 1998; 
Kosiorowski, 2005; Krasnodębski, 1991; Popa, 1992; Veatch, 2003; Zafirowski, 
2003; Zey, 1997).
The article refers to the methodologically rational person as to the one who 
takes methodologically rational decision or has displayed methodologically 
rational attitude. Decisions that are methodologically irrational do not fulfill one 
or some of the presented conditions (x, y, z). And the methodologically irrational 
attitude is the inclination of the acting person to making such decisions. Their 
source is irrational assertiveness – the inclination to irrational assertion. 
A  distinction should be made between methodologically rational decisions 
and factually rational actions. In the article it is assumed that factually rational 
actions are effective and efficient (economical) – their objective is reached in 
a way that is the most efficient (economical, generating as insignificant losses as 
possible) (Dennis, 2012; Hey, 1993, Kotarbiński, 1973, pp. 109, 123, 433). Factual 
rationality of acting might be referred to as “economical” rationality (Hey, 1993, 
p.  12), “formal” one (Kleszcz, 1998, p.  73). Factually irrational action does not 
fulfill the above conditions – does not accomplish the objective set (is ineffective) 
and/or is inefficient (results in more damage than other, the same or more 
effective, ways of achieving the objective).
Methodological and factual rationally (of decisions or actions) are linked to 
each other intentionally and bear the characteristics of cause‑effect relation. 
Factually rational acts are what rationally methodological decisions aim at 
(intentional relationship). A  methodologically rational subject makes use of 
available sources of knowledge to take the acts that are effective and efficient. 
Therefore, for instance, the Kotarbiński concept of rational acting is based on an 
assumption that methodologically rational attitudes facilitate factually rational 
actions (cause‑effect relation). The assumption is indisputable since the factually 
rational action is not an indispensable aftermath of methodologically rational 
decisions, and the factually irrational action is not a  necessary aftermath of 
methodologically irrational decisions. The above assumption concerns a tendency 
that allows exceptions so as to circumstances under which an act takes place. 
This refers to an idealised situation in which a  subject is fully knowledgeable 
about circumstances relevant to the subject’s effectiveness and efficiency, and has 
control over himself/herself. However, real situation might be not alike. It could 
occur that a decision is methodologically rational since it correctly (in line with 
conditions x, y, z) specifies the plan of acting. Yet, it is not factually rational due 
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to its own consequences, e.g., when – as a result of unpredictable circumstances 
or exogenous determinants – as well (methodologically rationally) planned act 
turns out to be ineffective and inefficient. In such situation methodologically 
rational decision leads to a factually irrational act. However, a reverse situation 
might occur – circumstances under which methodologically irrational decisions 
and attitudes lead to factually rational actions (e.g. decisions of Nikodem Dyzma 
in Kariera Nikodyma Dyzmy by Tadeusz Dołęga‑Mostowicz). Moreover, effective 
and efficient may be also the acts that do not result from any decisions (Ciesielski, 
2012: Simon, 1982).
The empirical study on the assumption may come down to comparing the 
effectiveness and efficiency of acts triggered by methodologically rational 
decisions with the ones not having this particular source.
Referring to the decision makers who value the security of their organisation 
and/or set such objectives that contribute to its security, the assumption could be 
formulated in the following way:
a. Hypothesis: Methodologically rational attitudes of members of an organisation 
impact positively its security.
The hypothesis has been partly proved by the researches within the theory 
of collective rationality, the example of which could be the concept of “invisible 
hand of market” by Adam Smith, concerning the cases in which members of 
an organisation striving to reach their own objectives contribute to security 
and welfare of the society, the members of which they are (Kosiorowski, 2005; 
Olson, 1965). The hypothesis describes a  tendency, but does not exclude 
exceptions.  For instance, there could occur specific circumstances under which 
a  methodologically irrational commitment of the organisation’s members to 
their superiors contributes to the security of the organisation more than their 
methodologically rational decisions.  However, in this case the methodological 
rationality of the superiors acts in favour of its security, which the hypothesis 
states. The hypothesis may be tested by comparing the security of the organisation 
when its decision makers take methodologically rational decisions and when they 
make decisions in methodologically irrational way. Further in the article the 
thesis will be investigated by the method of comparison between the model A and 
the model B. Because of the method, the above hypothesis can be limited in the 
following way:
b. Hypothesis: Methodologically rational attitudes of members of an organisation 
contribute to its security more than their methodologically irrational attitudes. 
The concept of methodologically irrational attitudes concerns either lack 
of the rational assertiveness indispensable for effective and efficient acting or 
irrational assertiveness, within which its subject regardless of his/her knowledge 
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is persistent in accomplishment of the action planned as well as in beliefs even 
though, what the subject might be aware of, they could be worse justified than 
any alternative acts (Bortolotti, 2010, p. 11). Such an attitude might be reflected 
in varied ways. In the article three examples will be considered: wishful thinking, 
superstitious attitude and ideological thinking in some areas and cases of 
management. 
Management of security
Wishful thinking as considered in the article (regulatory definition) occurs 
when a subject determines the truth or false, certainty or likelihood, justification 
of lack of justification of the subject’s beliefs in line with the subject’s wishes, 
considering what he/she would prefer. Wishful thinking is an advantageous 
phenomenon as it protects the human psyche from stress and might be socially 
approved (e.g. in case of motivation). Yet, it might also lead to pathology and be 
socially detrimental (Fotopoulou, Solms, Turnbull, 2004). Such a situation might 
occur, among others, when influenced by wishful thinking an individual or a team 
disregard threats since they generate stress.  Thus, instead of taking actions to 
prevent or counteract the threats, they streamline their efforts to create illusions 
of their security (Williams, 2004).
If self‑awareness of threats and counteracting them is stressful, which 
might be the case, then in groups engulfed in wishful thinking it is difficult to 
reach a  consensus regarding taking appropriate measures to ensure security of 
their organisation. Members of such groups either avoid stress by disregarding 
threats, or believe that the threats could be prevented in a stress less way. In such 
a situation their decisions (about the threats) might be postponed until it is already 
too late to start acting.
In order to retain support of society, those who manage wishfully thinking 
communities have to dedicate a  major part of their activity to minimise stress 
among the organisation’s members, for instance, through launching temporary 
solutions and discussing “substitute issues”, that are associated with the real 
problem to be resolved and through bringing about the problem illusionary 
solution, not being the solution itself. If the above results in a misleading sense 
of security, it could be and usually is in sheer contradiction to a  well perceived 
social interest. Such a state of affairs entails sluggishness of the processes aimed 
at security of an organisation and might even undermine it.
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In the light of the above discussions 3 suppositions should be considered:
a. Hypothesis: As a result of wishful thinking a subject (an individual or a group), 
impacted by it, partly or completely abandon the control over their security.
b. Hypothesis: Wishful thinking of an organisation’s members is an impediment 
to taking effective actions aimed at its security.
Methodologically rational attitudes do not induce the threats that the 
above hypotheses (a, b) indicate, as the attitudes are streamlined towards the 
well‑adjusted diagnosis of the situation and the acts are in line with the very 
situation. Therefore, they facilitate the identification of threats and acts that could 
effectively prevent or manage the threats:
c. Hypothesis: Wishful thinking exposes the subject (an individual or a  group) 
to threats that could be avoided thanks to adapting methodologically rational 
attitude.
Management of conflict
In the article unnecessary conflicts are considered those that might be avoided 
and that do more damage to the one who triggers them than preventing or solving 
them. Methodologically irrational attitude promotes (facilitates) the emergence 
and escalation of such conflicts, both intra‑ and inter‑ organisations ones, i.a. 
due to four reasons.  Firstly, within the methodologically irrational attitude it 
is possible to wishfully predict the aftermath of the conflict and prematurely 
consider it beneficial (needed). For instance, someone driven by desire of retorsion 
or punishment, as a result of wishful thinking may not take into consideration 
a  risk factor and carry out a  vendetta, which is not the best perceived interest 
of the someone. Secondly, in such an attitude false positive features could be 
attributed to a conflict, thus triggering the conflict and enhancing it. For instance, 
while reactive in suitable way to breaching the terms of an agreement by party, the 
party could be encouraged to maintaining the agreement terms. Wishful thinking 
of negotiators could undermine such an opportunity, notably when they associate 
the agreement – breaching party to have qualities like honesty, good‑faith 
acting, which are known to be non‑existent. This way threats are ignored and 
threat‑preventive acts are postponed until unspecified future. This might result 
in provoking in other party to escalating their demands and enforcing actions, 
thus entailing a situation when the conflict in its least desired shape is becoming 
increasingly of little likelihood or unlikely to be avoided. The conflict would be 
avoided if steps countering the occurred situation would have been taken early 
enough. 
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Wishful thinking might be linked to fear of checking or hostility against 
checking the justification of beliefs.  When the fear and the hostility are stay 
permanent within a  subject, this is a  case of an attitude that, according to 
Bocheński (1987) is called “superstitious” and the beliefs within the attitude 
“superstitions” (“prejudices”). The superstitious attitude should be distinguished 
from religious faith as the faith may but does not have to be connected with the 
superstitious attitude (Bocheński, 1993, pp. 325–467). Even the true and rightly 
justified theories and the noblest ideologies could be a superstitious if they reflect 
a superstitious attitude. Already in the remote past Socrates and Plato indicated 
its social detriment. Nowadays, among others representatives of analytical 
philosophy, e.g. Bocheński (1987; Jacko, 2013) and Popper (1996) have discussed 
some contemporary superstitions.
As it has already been considered, the subject having such a  superstitious 
attitude is unwilling to examine the justification of her/his superstitions and the 
subject can react with hostility to any attempts of questioning or investigating the 
grounds for the superstition. Therefore, the subject rather fights the opponents 
and forces them to change their approach to the issue than gets involved in 
exchanging opinions.  Therefore‑thirdly‑ the superstitious attitude significantly 
limits the possibility of a conclusive dialogue and hinders finding the grounds for 
reaching a consensus in the areas that the superstition involves.
The risk presented above was detected already by the Enlightment scholars, who 
– to prevent it – developed a tolerance tactics that imposes on parties to the social 
dialogue a requirement of avoiding disputes over beliefs that cannot be resolved by 
any other means than using force (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 63–91). However, the idea 
of tolerance is sometimes approved and embedded in the superstitious attitude, 
hence, becoming a source of unnecessary conflicts (Bocheński, 1987, p. 109).
The superstitious attitude may result in a  phenomenon that will be called 
“ideologising of thinking” (or “thinking in line with ideology”, “ideologised 
thinking”, “superstitious attitude towards ideology”), the concept of which is that: 
•	 somebody	(an	individual	or	a group)	superstitiously	believes	in	some	ideology,
•	 and	people,	who	do	not	act	like	this,	are	perceived	by	the	somebody	as	hostile	
individuals, only because they are not followers (worshipers) of the ideology.
The above mentioned circumstances are a prerequisite and when combined, 
they provide a precondition of the ideologised thinking attitude. Therefore, it – 
fourthly – leads to unnecessary ideological conflicts since it does not provide any 
basis to a conclusive dialogue concerning ideology‑determined issues.
Wishful thinking, superstitious attitude and ideological thinking are the 
examples of irrational assertiveness. Therefore, the above observations might be 
generalised in the following hypotheses:
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a. Hypothesis: Methodologically irrational attitudes of members of an 
organisation might trigger unnecessary intra‑ and inter‑ organisation conflicts 
and escalate them.
b. Hypothesis: Methodologically irrational attitudes of members of an 
organisation might impede consensus reaching.
If unnecessary conflicts arise between methodologically rational subjects, they 
do not result from methodologically rational attitudes. Admittedly, as a result of 
mistake or internal determination (e.g. anger) a rationally methodological subject 
may fuel the unwanted conflict, yet, such an act is not factually rational. Thus, it 
is not in line with the intention specific for a methodologically rational attitude. 
A  subject who tends to be rationally assertive (methodologically rational) 
avoids wishfulness while appraising people and predicted aftermath of the 
subject’s decisions. Such an appraisal is based on available knowledge that allows 
to determine the likelihood of the subject’s beliefs. The subject will then intend 
to get involved in disputes and discussions while seeking justification of the acts 
taken, which facilitates a rational discourse with no elements of fear and hostility 
that are typical for a superstitious attitude and ideologised thinking.
Ideology is associated with a set of notions, assumptions and values that are 
a driving force for the subject’s thinking and acting, that are a pattern to base on 
the thinking and acting processes (Eagleton, 1991, pp. 1–31). A methodologically 
rational subject may and should be some ideology driven since the subject 
needs both ontological and axiological criteria, i.a. to set a  primary purpose of 
the subject’s acts, evaluate both efficiency and effectiveness of the acts.  The 
subject also needs patterns of acting and thinking in order to improve them. 
Methodologically rational attitudes or decisions do not depend on abandoning 
the ideology. Their specificity is all about the methods the ideology is taken 
advantage of. The methodologically rational subjects distinguish between what 
they know from what they do not know; are able to differentiate between what 
they are sure of and what they suppose. The methodologically rational subject 
evaluates the likelihood and justification of their beliefs preferring those better 
justified in the light of his/her knowledge. Moreover, the subject considers all 
possible scenarios of acting, selecting the ones that optimise the pursuit of values 
preferred by the subject. The subject also examines the unexpected aftermath of 
a conflict, choosing such solutions to the conflict that are least detrimental in the 
light of the subject’s knowledge and adopted taxonomy of resources. The subject 
is able to question some elements of his/her ideology or interpret them if they are 
outside his/her knowledge. The subject knows well that some solutions based on 
the ideology he/she pursues have no proof and are a matter of the subject’s faith. 
Therefore, the subject would tend to avoid unnecessary conflicts since they are not 
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in the subject’s interest and when they are avoidable. The subject would investigate 
reasons of his/her beliefs and decisions, which facilitates a  rational dialogue 
concerning ideological issues, and helps avoid and ease disputes that are unlikely 
to be resolved (Fisher, Ury, Patton, 1991; Robinson, 1982; Olson, 1965; Ury, 2007).
The above observation might be generalised with the supposition that: 
a. Hypothesis: Methodologically rational attitudes of members of an organisation 
facilitates prevention and easing of unnecessary intra‑ and inter‑ organisation 
conflicts.
The exception to the above rule might be situations in which a methodologically 
rational subject reckons that a conflict is either inevitable or advantageous. This 
possibility is not contradictory to the above hypothesis as it concerns solely the 
unnecessary conflicts in the assumed meaning.
Management of change
Groundbreaking innovations reveal the hitherto unknown way of reaching 
the objectives set. They require a  change to the accepted methods of thinking 
and acting. The superstitious attitude hinders revolutionary innovations in the 
fields it concerns (although it does not have to be so in other fields). For instance, 
if members of an organisation superstitiously believe that its hitherto shape and 
way of operating have to be the only possible or the best one, they will be fearful of 
and hostile towards any changes in the organisation, even if the changes optimise 
the accomplishment of its specific objectives.  Such changes can be wrongly 
perceived as “betrayal” of the organisation, although the realm is much different 
(Koźmiński, Latusek‑Jurczak, 2011, pp. 76–83, 95–101). When such an attitude 
is typical for the organisation’s decision‑makers, it could lead to the abandonment 
of necessary changes and result in stagnation within the organisation, which may 
pose a  threat to its existential and functional security (Bicchieri, 1997; Dixit, 
Nalebuff, 1991; Koons, 2009; Mintzberg, 1994).
A  superstitious attitude may motivate to creating evolutionary innovations 
at the expense of revolutionary ones. A good example in this context is dogmatic 
resistance of astronomers to accepting the heliocentric system in times of 
disputes over the structure of the solar system. Such an attitude motivated 
them to mathematical evolutionary innovations while calculating and predicting 
the movement of celestial bodies which in the geocentric model had extremely 
complicated trajectories, although they were aware of the fact that the heliocentric 
models allows much simpler calculations, which was then proved by, i.a. Mikołaj 
Kopernik. Not only in the field of science, but also in social praxis there are abundant 
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examples of how the superstitions attitude facilitates evolutionary innovations at 
the expense of much needed revolutionary ones.  For instance, “wrong legalism” 
is a superstition of being fearful of change to the law that is unjust and socially 
detrimental since it does not consider specific or new circumstances (Fletcher, 
1966, pp. 18–22). Legalists may display their large inventiveness while adjusting 
the law to requirements of justice instead of questioning it and amending it in such 
a way that it is free of the above imperfections. A similar situation occurs when 
superstitiously cultivated ideological motives lead to improvements to the methods 
of staging a war, at the expense working on and making use of safer, cheaper and 
the same effective (in long term) possibilities of reaching the war objectives using 
peaceful methods, e.g. would, however, require a more radical change to the way of 
thinking and acting. In such cases irrational assertiveness hinders changes aimed 
at enhancing security of an organisation, e.g. fear of heliocentrism impeded the 
development of astronomy, wrong legalism threatens efficient functioning of state 
and law institutions, and the above case of superstitions belief in war ideology lead 
to squandering resources of society and poses unnecessary threats to the society 
itself. 
When a social group has a superstitious attitude to ideology (is engulfed by 
ideologised thinking), its members might rejected the fact that actions taken in 
the name of the ideology do not result in achieving its ideal, as it was the case 
in the event of such social revolutions that despite their being successful failed 
to reach their purpose, although the proponents of the revolutions claimed that 
the purpose had been achieved. Reluctance, proved by superstitious attitude, to 
examine the nature of the superstition might lead to duplicating ways of thinking 
and acting, already known to be ineffective, inefficient and counter‑productive. 
For instance, such an attitude could be useful while combating social inequalities 
in the way that is already known for deepening the inequalities (the same or new 
and even worse ones), fighting social injustice in the way that leads to not less 
significant injustice, promoting universal human rights in the way that leads to 
violating them. 
The hazards indicated in this section stem from irrational assertiveness, typical 
for methodologically irrational attitudes. Therefore, the above observations might 
be generalised using the following hypothesis:
a. Hypothesis: Methodologically rational attitudes of members of an organisation 
might impede the launch of ground‑breaking innovations aimed at enhancing 
its security.
Questioning of superstition requires a  change to perception of reality. This 
is possible only within a  methodologically rational attitude that includes the 
investigation into and methodologically rational choice of solutions, making use 
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of available sources of knowledge, following the rule of efficient acting. Such 
an attitude facilitates innovation and rationalization of acting that enhance 
improvement to security of an organisation: 
b. Hypothesis: Methodologically rational attitudes facilitate innovation and 
rationalization of acting that enhance improvement to security of an 
organisation.
Conclusions and some perspectives of researching  
and action taking
The objective of the analyses presented in the article is a relationship occurring 
between methodologically rational or irrational attitudes of members of an 
organisation and its security. The theoretical aim of the article has been reached 
through a detailed discussion on the relationship based on hypotheses and their 
partial justification. Although the hypotheses might seem obvious, they should be 
further tested and examined as their presentation is incomplete and does not meet 
requirements of a scientific proof. Yes, putting the hypotheses forward, opens up 
the prospects for further theoretical and empirical researches.
Proving the hypothesis included in the article might consist in comparing cases 
within which members of an organisation take methodologically rational decision 
with the ones in which their decisions are methodologically irrational, both 
options, however, concern specific aspects and analogical situations regarding 
security of the organisation. If in majority of the cases compared, they state 
the above hypotheses, then (partly, proportionally to the research findings) the 
hypothesis will be proved right.
Indicating the cases, in which the hypotheses cannot be proved, may not be 
sufficient to falsify them as they refer to tendencies and have been formulated in 
a way that allows exceptions. The exceptions might be determined, i.a. for two 
reasons: Firstly, in reality and due to the factors not considered in the models 
discussed, organisations, where methodologically irrational attitudes dominate, 
might be more secure than the ones dominated by methodologically rational 
attitudes.  Secondly, security is an aspect – like feature of an organisation – it 
may enhance in one aspect, and fade in the others. Therefore, both rational and 
irrational attitudes of an organisation members might impact its security in one 
aspect, with no impact on another. Thus, exceptions to the rules determined by 
the hypotheses raised in the article do not provide the proof that the hypotheses 
are false. Exception of that kind should be investigated, though, in order to 
identify more detailed interdependencies determined by the hypotheses basing on 
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the question: What situations and aspects, what factors and why result in the fact that 
either methodologically rational attitudes of members of organisation do not enhance its 
security, or methodologically irrational attitudes do not pose a threat to it? 
Proving the presented hypotheses false might concern, i.a., the fact that 
under identical circumstances for organisation that differ only in terms of 
methodological rationality or irrationality of its decision‑makers and in the long 
term, either the differentiation does not impact the security of the organisation 
in all the security aspects, or in the set security aspect methodologically irrational 
attitudes of the decision‑makers serve its security better than methodologically 
rational attitudes. However, identifying or creating (through an experiment) of 
such identical situations might be difficult, but not impossible.
The article presents the method of explaining and predicting the connection 
between the attitudes and the organisation’s security through comparing the ideal 
types and phenomenological analysis. Further researches into this connection can 
apply this method through comparing other models in other aspects than those 
included in the analyses conducted in the article in order to determine, formulate 
and examine more detailed research hypotheses, or in case analysis. For instance, 
it cannot be excluded, that a decline in methodologically rational attitudes might 
provide an explanation to some threats that the contemporary organisations, 
including states and international organisations are striving with.
The article does not discuss all the aspects of rational acting, e.g., those 
indicated in the concept of rational communication (Habermas, 2002), distinction 
between axiological and instrumental, or formal from material (Gellner, 1992; 
Weber, 1985, p. 565) rationality of acting, and others. These could be accomplished 
through further analyses, the basis for which could be theoretical research 
undertaken in the article.
The paper accomplishes its practical objective by presenting some reasons 
to develop the skills and competences of methodologically rational decision – 
making and to consider them the recruitment. As shown, they have a significant 
impact on security of organisations.  This conclusion is nothing new. Already 
ancient philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, claimed that the “right reason” 
and virtue facilitates performing civic and managerial roles. They identified the 
factors and methods of selecting people managing an organisation (e.g. ruling 
a state) in terms of their competences and skills (Jaeger, 1964). Nowadays these 
findings are implemented, i.a., in the theory of virtues in management (Dyck, 
Neubert, 2008; Rego, Cunha, Clegg, 2012; van Hooft, 2013) and in conflict 
management (Bickmore, 2003). 
The article does not address a practical question: How to develop and examine 
these competences and skills of rational decision making?, since it has not been its 
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objective. The answer is included in the literature on this field. For instance, 
the antique concept of developing a  virtue includes tactics and techniques of 
developing, what in the article has been referred to as methodological rationality 
of decisions and attitudes, since in this respect the virtue is reflected in rational 
decision‑making (Jaeger 1964). Further theories of rationality develop the 
antique concept (Gomez, 2014). Nowadays, there is a  heated debate concerning 
the question of whether university can and should develop competences and skills 
of making decisions in a methodologically rational way. Concepts of how to teach 
such skills are being formulated (e.g.. Newman, 1978, 1990; Ortega  y  Gasset, 
1978). For instance, the idea of skills and competences on the fifth and higher 
level of education included in The European Qualifications Framework for Life Long 
Learning (n.d.) determines the aspects of what, in the article, is referred to as 
methodological rationality and how to implement and develop it (Palomba, 2008). 
The methods of determining whether someone is predisposed to methodologically 
rational decision making are developed, i.a. in psychology (e.g. Bortolotti, 2010; 
Fotopoulou, Solms, Turnbull, 2004; Williams, 2004), psychological psychometrics 
(Simon, Härter, 2007) or mathematical game theory (e.g. Kelly, 2003).
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